



Redefining the Relationship Between the Energy Charter Treaty and the Treaty of Functioning 
of the European Union: From a Normative Conflict to Policy Tensions  
 




Investment arbitration in the European Union is currently experiencing one of its most crucial 
challenges. At EU level, there are different voices claiming that the applicability of jurisdictional 
and substantive investment protections in international agreements to resolve intra-EU disputes 
is no longer valid. This includes the intra-EU application of one of the most important sectorial 
international agreements: the Energy Charter Treaty. The main argument flagged by these voices 
is the existence of a conflict between the normative content of these international agreements and 
EU Law. Parallel to these criticisms, in the EU, there has been an unprecedented increase of intra-
EU disputes in the energy sector, most of these brought under the ECT and yet to be decided 
under international arbitration. However, despite a general perception of an asymbiotic 
relationship between investment arbitration and the EU legal order, there has been limited 
evidence of a real normative conflict. In response, taking as example the intra-EU ECT cases, this 
article undertakes a cross-treaty study of the most frequently invoked treaty provisions and 
principles in the intra-EU ECT practice. The article aims to provide for a clearer evidence about 
the type of relationship that characterises the ECT and the TFEU. Contrary to the general 
perception, the article finds no evidence of a normative conflict between the ECT and the TFEU. 
The article concludes by redefining the relationship between the ECT and the TFEU as a 




There are always two sides to every debate. However, criticisms of international 
investment law are so divergent that we have been forced to live in a multidimensional context. 
Observers of the international investment law system often have different appreciations of 
investment arbitration. Luckily enough, among the international investment community, there is 
a common agreement that the relationship between EU Law and intra-EU investment arbitration 
is a constant challenge. The challenge between investment arbitration and the EU legal order 
pertains policy and normative spheres. From a policy perspective, one of the most recent 
documents published by the European Commission re-confirms the EU’s concerns about the 
incompatibility of international investment arbitration within the European Union, in particular 
the status of intra-EU international investment agreements as incompatible with EU Law.2 
 
From a normative perspective, the current status of the relationship between the EU legal 
order and international investment arbitration has its origins in the proliferation of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements within Europe. In particular, in the EU, parallel to the proliferation of 
investment agreements, the EU’s regulatory scope has expanded into new commercial areas, 
originally exclusively covered by international agreements.3  
 
In this respect, EU commentators have claimed that the investment protections available 
in treaties signed by intra-EU parties are not exceptional, as the EU also offers similar protections. 
Hence, normative conflicts between EU Law and investment protection are possible and exist.4  
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To fully appreciate the normative relationship between investment treaty protections and 
the EU legal order, it is important to observe the history that precedes the intra-EU debate. First, 
it is necessary to look into the amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty; Lisbon was created to 
amend the TFEU and the TEU, both of these treaties remain separate after these amendments. In 
particular, the TFEU brought some clarity to the expansive regulatory scope of the EU by 
explicitly including foreign direct investment (FDI) as part of the EU’s common commercial 
policies. The inclusion of FDI into the TFEU means that all issues related to foreign investment 
between MS (including old and new MS) became exclusively the competence of the EU. As a 
consequence, it seemed that the protections given to intra-EU foreign investors in international 
agreements were no longer necessary or incompatible.5  
 
In fact, since 2009 the European Commission has initiated a series of legal actions to 
manifest their position. First, the European Commission started proceedings against specific MS 
requesting them to terminate some of their intra-EU BITs given their incompatibility with EU 
Law. More recently, the European Commission has prohibited the enforcement of an intra-EU 
BIT award, under the argument that the payment of an awarded sum of money amounts to a 
violation of EU State-aid rules.6 However, unlike intra-EU BITs, the European Commission has 
refrained from initiating proceedings requesting to terminate the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
Nonetheless, there is early evidence that the policy and regulatory phenomena that questioned the 
normative validity of intra-EU BITs has also affected the status of the ECT in the EU.7  
  
At this point, it is also important to explain that the ECT has different characteristics from 
an intra-EU BIT. Firstly, the ECT is more than an investment treaty; it is a multilateral framework 
for energy cooperation which focuses in four areas: foreign investments, trade, transit and 
environmental protections.8 Secondly, unlike intra-EU BITs, the ECT was collectively signed by 
the ECSC, EURATOM and the European Communities, surviving today as ECT signatories the 
European Commission and EURATOM.9 Thirdly, the ECT is an international treaty which 
includes as its signatories not only all the Member States of the EU, but also includes the 
participation of other third states as signatories.10  
 
                                                        
1 Dr Gloria M Alvarez can be contacted at gloria.alvarez@abdn.ac.uk or alvarez.gloriamaria@gmail.com   
2European Commission, DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, ‘Consultation 
Document: Prevention and amicable resolution of disputes between investors and public authorities within the single 
market’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-investment-protection-mediation-consultation-
document_en_0.pdf > accessed 31 August 2017.  
3In the words of Professor George Bermann: ‘…EU Law and international arbitration law have long had their 
respective ‘first principles’ each developing its own in largely splendid isolation…’ George Bermann, ‘Navigating 
EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration’, (2012) 28 Arbitration International 3, 443. 
4Juliane Kokkot and Christoph Sobotta, ‘Investment Arbitration and EU Law’, (2016) Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 3-9. 
5Hanno Wehland, ‘Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: Is European Law an Obstacle?’, (2009) 58 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2, 297. 
6Case T-704/15 and T-694/15 Micula and Others v The Commission. 
7 Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law 
and Liability (30 November 2012) paras 4.89-4.191.  
8  ECT also covers portfolio investments, which are not foreign direct investments.  
9 At the time of the signature of the ECT, the European Communities, ECSC, EEC and EURATOM had legal 
personality and capacity enter to international agreements with third states and other institutions. With the signature 
of the Treaty on European Union, European Community Law was subsequently referred as EU Law.  
10 On December 2014, Italy notified of its withdraw from the Energy Charter Treaty, taking effect on the 1 January 
2016, pursuant to ECT Article 47(3). See Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Italy at the Intentional Energy Charter’, 
<http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/members-observers/countries/italy/> accessed 7 May 2016.  For the 
purposes of this paper, the United Kingdom is one of the MS of the EU. 
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Technically, the ‘intra-EU’ aspect of the ECT has always existed, this is because the ECT 
was concluded by the then MS. This intra-EU aspect continued to exist with the accession of 
Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, countries which were already ECT members. 
Further, in the ECT there is no disconnection clause between its EU signatories.11 As 
consequence, the ECT is binding between MS and the EU itself and therefore all signatories have 
agreed to assume obligations inter- se.12  
 
More recently, the intra-EU aspect of the ECT has gained attention at the CJEU. An 
Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet briefly allured to the lack of incompatibility of the ECT 
within the EU legal order; but failed at providing conclusive evidence.13 In this opinion, AG 
Wathelet highlights that -unlike intra-EU BITs14- in the ECT, all intra-EU parties have an equal 
footing and are bound by provisions of investment protection and the ISDS mechanism that 
operates in the ECT.  Tantalizingly, Wathelet’s opinion attributes the ECT’s compatibility to the 
fact that so far, none of the ECT’s intra-EU Contracting Parties had sought the opinion of the 
CJEU. Thus, Wathelet seems to suggest that lack of suspicion on the ECT’s incompatibility is 
due to the fact that Contracting Parties have assumed that the ECT is compatible with the EU 
legal order.15 
 
 In numbers, the ECT Secretariat has registered a significant increase of intra-EU disputes, 
at about 60 cases out of 108 are currently registered.16 This is the background which incentivises 
the present discussion and aims to move from suspicions to a more objective analysis on the ECT 
status in the EU. This is, of course, a task with many dimensions which has at its onset already 
benefited from previous commentators.17 However, there is a need for further explanations and 
                                                        
11 Maja Smrkolj, ‘The Use of the 'Disconnection Clause' in International Treaties: What Does it tell us about the 
EC/EU as an Actor in the Sphere of Public International Law?’ < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133002>, accessed on 
14 November 2015, 1-15; Marise Cremona, ‘Defending Community interest: The duties if cooperation and 
compliance’ in Marise Cremona and Bruno De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations: Law Constitutional 
Fundamentals (Hart 2008), 125-170 and Jan Klabbers, ‘Safeguarding the organizational acquis: The EU’s external 
practice’, (2007) 4 International Organizations Law Review, 57. 
12 Andres Delgado Casteleiro, ‘EU disconnection clauses and Energy Charter Treaty’, presentation given in Queen 
Mary, University of London Conference: The EU and investment arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty, 11 – 
12 February 2016 (London). The lack of disconnection clause in the ECT was confirmed recently in Infrastructure 
(G.P.) Limited and RREEF v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction (6 June 2016) 
para 81and Charanne and Construction Investments v Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No. V 062/2012, Award (21 
January 2016), 438. 
13 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet 19 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:699.  
14 Previously, arbitration tribunals have also attempted to implement compatibility analysis between intra-EU BITs 
and EU Law substantive protections in investment treaties, for example: Československa obchodní banka A.S.(CSOB) 
v Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (24 May 1999) this is  case under the 
Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic Regarding 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management 
Limited v Republic of Hungary , ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Arbitration Award (27 September 2006), this a case 
under the Agreement between the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Government of the 
Republic of Cyprus on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment and CME Czech Republic BV v Czech 
Republic, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Arbitration Award (13 of September 2001). 
15 Thank you to the ICSID reviewers for this suggestion.  
16 For a comprehensive list of all the pending cases under the ECT see International Energy Charter, ‘List of all 
Investment Dispute Settlement Cases’ <http://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/all-
investment-dispute-settlement-cases/ > accessed 20 January 2018.  
17 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘European Policy Space in International Investment Law’, (2012) 27 ICSID Review 2, 416-
431, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Investment protection and EU Law: The intra-and extra- EU dimension of the Energy 
Charter Treaty’, (2012) 14 Journal of International Economic Law 1, 85-109 and Thomas Roe and Matthew Happold, 
Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty (Cambridge University Press 2011) 89–103, 
Christer Söderlund, ‘The Future of the Energy Charter Treaty in the context of the Lisbon Treaty', Graham Coop 
(ed.), Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty (Juris 2011), 99-
125  
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clarifications. Therefore, the analysis below centres the discussion on a comparative analysis of 
the most frequently invoked treaty provisions in the intra-EU ECT practice. The aim of this paper 
is to clarify and define the type of relationship that characterises the ECT within the EU legal 
order.  
 
Firstly, the article summarises the different policy and regulatory approaches to the energy 
sector under EU Energy Law and the ECT, respectively. Secondly, the paper discusses the notion 
of normative conflict in public international law. Thirdly, there is a jurisdictional and substantive 
comparative analysis between the most frequently invoked treaty provisions in the TFEU- ECT 
relationship. The last section of the article reflects on the intra-EU applicability of the ECT and 
claims that the type of relationship that characterises the ECT and the TFEU is not a relationship 
of conflict, but rather a relationship of tension.  
 
II. THE POLICY SPHERE 
 
For more than twenty years, the ECT has been the only multilateral investment agreement 
covering energy investments between an investor from a EU Member State (MS) in another MS. 
However, parallel to the existence of the ECT, European countries were handcrafting an 
unprecedented regional union with ambitious goals. More than twenty years have passed after the 
creation of the ECT, and the EU has achieved to create a sophisticated and complex legal union 
binding on twenty-eight European Countries. Coincidentally, all of them are also signatories of 
the ECT.18 
 
 Historically, the ECT and the EU have shared the same policy (concerns) and objectives of 
achieving peace and prosperity by economic agreements where steel and coal were key natural 
resources to be controlled. As a matter of fact, the EU was founded upon two energy related 
treaties.19 The EU has not only expanded geographically, but it has also expanded its regulatory 
scope. The EU’s regulatory expansion has also created a regulatory ‘spill’ on the regulatory space 
of its MS. For example, the CJEU case law has worked on ensuring that EU market participants 
enjoy fundamental market freedoms; where MS national laws cannot contravene the principles of 
free movement of goods, services, capital and workers.20 The CJEU has also established a formula 
whereby EU traders could challenge national –more restrictive– laws, which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra (EU) trade.21Nonetheless, through 
the evolution of CJEU case law, there is a more balanced approach between trade freedoms and 
MS’ regulatory powers; this is because the EU has also introduced mechanisms to test the 
application of public policy restrictions.22 
 
Regarding investment treaties, the CJEU has protected EU regulatory interests in light of 
its international obligations. For example, at the request of the Commission, the CJEU has 
                                                        
18 See n 10.   
19 Kim Talus and Raphael Heffron, ‘Energy Law in the 21st Century: A Paradigm Shift’, (2016) 9 Journal of World 
Energy Law and Business 3, 3.  
20 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, European Policy Space in International Investment Law’, See  (n 17) 416–431 and Case 
26/62 NV, Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration [1963] ECR 1, 12. 
21 Case C- 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR-82, para 5. 
22 The counter-balance between EU freedoms and regulatory powers from MS is in principle based on mandatory 
requirements related to the particular effectiveness of fiscal supervision, protection of public health, fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer. Joined Cases C–267/91 and C–268/91 Criminal 
proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1991] ECR I–6097, para. 16 and Case C-120/78 Rewe-
Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649, para. 8 and Akaterina 
Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, Studies in International Investment Law (Nomos 2014) 
57.  
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reviewed the compatibility of some BITs in accordance to Article 307 EC Treaty.23 The CJEU 
concluded that these three MS infringed their obligations in relation to free transfers of capital 
(ex Articles 57(2), 59 and 60(1) TEC).24 This transfer clause guarantees that any transfer of capital 
(i.e. profits, liquidation sums, loan reimbursement, expense payments, etc.) connected to the 
investment should be made without undue delay.  
 
In this case, the Commission submitted that this free transfer of capital provided in the 
BITs is comparable with TEC Article 56, which regulates free movement of capital. The 
difference is that in order to preserve Article 56, the EU legal order also imposes some restrictions 
to regulate economic and monetary difficulties.25Additionally, the CJEU can also impose free 
movement of capital restrictions in order to freeze funds in the fight against terrorism.26Moreover, 
in the Pringle Case the CJEU discussed that the primacy of EU Law requires that a MS cannot 
evade its EU Law obligations in light of its international obligations.27 In the same way the EU 
respects the competences allocated to their MS, which means that international law obligations 
may not: 
 
“…adversely […] affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the 
Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the Community legal order, which 
must be assured by the Court of Justice…”28 
 
In this respect, some commentators could suggest that CJEU case law could provide for 
the much-needed guidance on how EU Law may interact with other international agreements such 
as the ECT.29 Under CJEU, landmark cases like Kadi have concluded that EU is an autonomous 
legal order which is different from national and international law. Most importantly, it has been 
also concluded that the EU Treaties, including the TFEU, are more than international law.30 Also, 
the fact that the CJEU has the ultimate competence on the interpretative authority on EU law, 
leads to a couple of practical reflections. Firstly, the CJEU gives priority to EU Law when there 
                                                        
23 Case C-205/06 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2009] ECR I-1301, paras 16-23, 
Case C-249/06 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden [2009] ECR I-1335, paras 16-23 
and Case C- 118/07 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Finland ECR [2009] I- 10889, paras 
16-23. Article 307 EC Treaty (now Article 351 TFEU) provides that Member States shall take all appropriate measure 
and steps to eliminate incompatibilities between EU Law and other International Treaties signed by Member States.  
24 European Commission, Court of Justice of the European Union on the Free Movement of Capital 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/framework/court/index_en.htm> accessed 4 October 2017.  
25 Article 56 EC Treaty prohibits any restrictions of capital movement or payments between Member States 
themselves or with third countries.  
26 Nikos Lavranos, ‘Commission v Austria and Sweden’, (2009) 103 The American Journal of International Law, 
718; Case T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusfu and Al Brakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, para. 146 
and Steffen Hindelang, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU’s Judicial Monopoly by Resorting to 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se Treaties? The Case of Intra-EU Investment Arbitration, 
(2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 2, 201. 
27 Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and The Attorney General [2002] ECR I-756 
28 Opinion 1/91 Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free 
Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area (‘EEA I’) (1991) ECR I-
6079, paras 35 and 21 and Opinion 1/09 Creation of a unified patent litigation system - European and Community 
Patents Court - Compatibility of the draft agreement with the Treaties [2011] ECR I-0000, 67. 
29 It is outside the scope of this article to study the hierarchical nature of EU Law according to the CJEU practice. 
However, it is important to mention for the EU courts it is undisputable that EU Law should be distinguished from 
public international law, but rather should be seen as a type of national and/or municipal nature which fundamentally 
has a constitutional nature. For more see C. Timmermans, ‘The EU and Public International Law’, (1991), 4 European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 180-181.  
30 Katja.Ziegler, ‘International Law and EU law: Between Asymmetric Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation’ in 
Alexander Orakhelashvili, Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, (Elgar  2011),  268 
and Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses Wessel (eds.), International Law as Law of the European Union 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2011),  1-6. 
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is a conflict of supreme authority between international law, which raises potential issues about 
the hierarchy of MS’ international obligations under EU Law.31  
 
This potential scope for conflict – to some extent – has diminished the international role 
of its MS as sovereign entities with international legal capacity.32 In the case of the ECT, MS and 
all other signatories expressed their regulatory interests which were proportionally calibrated to 
attract foreign investment and protect their investors abroad. In doing so, MS have confined and 
compromised their policy space. Therefore, what it used to be the MS’ power to make-or-break 
international investments has now been debilitated by the expansion of the EU’s regulatory scope.  
 
As with the ECT and BITs, the EU legal order creates rules and laws for the treatment of 
trade and investment; a task which has contributed to the regional development of trade in the 
EU, but also created a misunderstanding on the existence how the TFEU has displaced the intra-
EU aspect of the ECT.33  
 
III. THE ECT AND EU ENERGY LAW  
 
The amendments brought by the TFEU also included the explicit inclusion of energy as a 
shared competence. Unlike FDI and the interpretation of EU Law, where the EU has exclusive 
competence, energy is a shared competence between the EU and its MS.34 In this respect, from a 
policy perspective, EU Energy Law has evolved at regulating energy consumption through the 
promotion of trade, interconnection between MS, clean energy sources and energy efficiency 
techniques aiming to secure independently its own energy demand. In contrast, the ECT places 
foreign investors and states in an international law playing field, which provides for a non-
discriminatory cross border co-operation. Therefore, there are different agendas and objectives in 
EU Energy Law and the ECT, which confirms that the energy sector is of a multidimensional 
nature, and therefore it is difficult to regulate the entire energy sector into one single legal 
framework. The many commercial, legal and geopolitical aspects orbiting around energy 
transactions cannot be tighten up within one single normative body of law. Any attempt to do so 
will inevitably present normative deficiencies.  
 
In fact, EU Energy Law commentators have defined the ECT as a cross-European 
initiative, which ensures a level playing field based on non-traditional EU principles that generate 
and promote legal uniformity and consensus on energy security policies.35In particular, the ECT 
has been recognised as the only major multilateral agreement, which builds a legal framework for 
global energy security based on the principles of transparency, open and -most importantly- non-
discriminatory markets.36Moreover, as discussed below, the ECT is the only energy cross-border 
instrument that sets compensation as the key condition for the legality of an expropriation. In 
                                                        
31 Albert Posch, ‘The Kadi case: Rethinking the Relationship between EU Law and International Law?’, (2009) 15 
The Columbia Journal of European Law Online, 1-9.   
32 Karen Alter, ‘Who are the Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice’, 
(1998) 52 International Organization 1, 121-147.  
33 European Commission, ‘EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Draft Agreement’ 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468>, accessed 29 April 2016 and European Commission, 
‘Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1467> accessed 29 April 2017.   
34  “… under Article 4(1)(i) TFEU energy in its wide sense, is expressly referred to as a matter of shared 
competence…” in Rafael Leal-Arcas and Andrew Filis, ‘Conceptualizing energy security through an EU 
Constitutional perspective’, (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 5, 1245.   
35 Angus Johnston and Guy Block, EU Energy Law (Oxford University Press 2012), 283 and Martha Roggenkamp, 
Catherine Redgwell, Annita Rønne and Iñigo del Guayo, Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International 
Regulation (Oxford University Press 2016), 141.  
36 Johnston and Block (n 35) 84. 
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addition, energy treatises have also recognised the uniqueness of the ECT as an international 
agreement which offers an alternative dispute mechanism (i.e. international arbitration and/or 
conciliation), which builds confidence at ensuring legality by reducing the risks involved in 
foreign energy investments.37 
 
In contrast to the policy reasons that motivated the creation of the ECT, the EU has a 
diverse set of reasons that motivated the regulation of the energy sector. For example, while some 
MS needed to prioritise their public interest goals such as environmental protections, others were 
more concerned about liberalising the energy market and securing energy supply in a cost-
effective manner.38 Therefore, EU Energy Law presents an important legal uniformity challenge, 
as there are twenty-eight MS with diversity in the legal and policy energy frameworks.39 For 
example, each MS gives a different treatment to energy investors (i.e. France, Greece and Cyprus 
still have a large degree of state involvement, as well as a largely vertically integrated market), 
which presents a non-equal treatment in each MS.  
 
This diverse nature of electricity market producers in the EU has fuelled national energy 
regulators to make policy choices.40 These policy choices seem to oscillate from the private/state 
owned challenges of the internal energy market to the achievement of environmental targets and 
goals. In this respect, EU environmental goals and regulation do not draw any distinctions about 
the ownership of the utilities. Consequently, this has forced the EU to reduce its policy priorities 
on the security supply and the promotion and generation of electricity from renewable sources to 
fight climate change.41 For example, the most important regulatory success of the EU is the 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which is the key tool to reduce CO2 emissions by means of 
a ‘cap and trade’ system, which operates in the MS.42 In addition to EU ETS, the energy regulatory 
actions of the EU are also found in the 2020 climate and energy package which aims to reduce 
20% of the EU’s greenhouse emissions, raising consumption from renewable sources to 20% and 
therefore improving efficiency by 20%.43However, despite the 2020 Energy package ambitions, 
this does not cover entirely all the inherent elements of the energy sector, or the whole of the EU 
energy market regulation.44 
 
                                                        
37 Ibid, 291. 
38 Angus Johnston, ‘The Future Shape of EU Energy Law and Policy' in Anthony Arnull, Catherine Barnard, Michael 
Dougan and Eleonor Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Allan 
Dashwood, (Hart 2011), 398. Without a successful outcome, the EU aimed to fully integrate the electricity and gas 
markets of the twenty-eight Member State by 2014 in ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’ <http://www.roadmap2050.eu>, 
accessed 20 September 2017.  
39 Francis McGowan, ‘Can the European Union’s Market Liberalism Ensure Energy Security in a Toe of “Economic 
Nationalism”?’ (2008) 4 Journal of Contemporary European Research 2, 90-106.   
40 “…The UK provides a case point, having moved during its EU membership from vertically integrated and publicly 
… while France maintained both a strong degree of vertical integration and state involvement in the energy 
sphere…” in Angus Johnston, See (n 38) 399. See also Dominique Finon, ‘French Electricity Policy: The 
Effectiveness and Limitations of Colbertism’ in Francis McGowan (ed.), European Energy Policies in A Changing 
Environment, (Springer 1996), 21-56.  
41 European Commission, ‘Towards A European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply’ <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52000DC0769> accessed 23 April 2017, 769.  
42 European Commission, The EU Emissions Trading System is binding for all MS in the form of a Directive and is 
the cornerstone of the European Union’s policy to combat climate chance in: European Commission, ‘The EU 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)’, <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> accessed 17 January 
2017.  
43 European Commission, ‘The 2020 Climate and Energy Package’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm> accessed 17January 2017.  
44 “… Energy is a multidimensional matter that needs regulation coverage in production, transport, distribution, 
sale and consumption of energy…” in Leal-Arcas and Filis (n 34) 1235. 
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EU energy policy choices have not been exclusively driven by common commercial 
policies, but also by the fact that certain energy competences are retained by MS. The immediate 
consequence of the EU not having exclusive competence on the energy sector is that MS can 
legislate where the EU cannot. This can potentially segregate certain aspects of the EU energy 
policy internally and externally. Therefore, one could argue that at least for the investment 
dimension of each MS, the ECT reaches those corners where EU Energy Law cannot.  
Particularly, at the post-investment stage where under the ECT, MS have agreed to grant specific 
treatment to investors’ nationals from another MS. Moreover, the ECT is able to supplement the 
energy relationships between its intra-EU signatories where the energy policy space of the EU 
has not exercised its shared competence.45 To the date, most of the debate on the applicability of 
the ECT to resolve cross border intra-EU energy disputes has predominately taken place in 
practice.  The legal transformation of the EU Energy Law can be seen on the type of disputes 
which have arisen between MS and energy investors. As explained earlier, the effects of 
decentralisation and new clean energy policies have shaped the type of intra-EU ECT disputes.  
 
For example, AES Summit and Electrabel were only the beginning of a significant increase 
of intra-EU ECT disputes.46 The increase of intra-EU ECT disputes could be attributed 
particularly to two events. First, MS using preferential tax schemes to accelerate the 
decentralisation of their own electricity markets had to discontinue this special treatment in order 
to comply with the new EU laws on State-aid. Secondly, MS national decarbonisation targets 
aiming to promote clean energy sources heavily relied in offering to foreign investors special 
schemes of national feed-in tariffs (FITs).  FITs as clean energy strategies were ambitious and did 
not foresee the financial and technological challenges the renewable industry represents. As 
consequence, national schemes went beyond the financial capabilities of some MS and FITs had 
to be withdrawn from foreign investors.47 The publicly available cases of Charanne v Spain, 
RREEF v Spain and Eiser v Kingdom of Spain illustrate these regulatory changes on FITs.48 
                                                        
45 “…The TFEU Art 2(2) also states that in cases where the EU shares competence in a specific area with Member 
States, the latter shall be able to exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised competence 
in a specific area…” in Sujitha Subramanian, ‘EU Obligation to the TRIPS Agreement: EU Microsoft Decision’, 
(2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 4, 997-1023. 
46Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-1301, Case C-249/06 Commission v Sweden [2009] ECR I-
1335, Case C-118/07 Commission v Finland [2009] ECR I-10889 and Panos Koutrakos, Case C-205/06, Commission 
v Austria, Judgement of 3 March 2009; Case C-249/06, Commission v Sweden, Judgement of the Court of 3 March 
2009, (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 6, 2060. Decision C (2014) 3192 final of 26 May 2014 issued in Case 
State-aid SA.38517 (2014/NN) - ordering Romania to suspend any action which may lead to the execution or 
implementation of the award of 11 December 2013 in the case Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v Romania 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20) and Action brought on 2 September 2014 — Micula a.o. v Commission (Case T-
646/14) (2014/C 439/40) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014TN0646> 
accessed 5 May 2017.  
47 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Global Financial Crisis and its Impact on Renewable 
Energy Finance, <http://www.unep.org/pdf/dtie/Study_Financial_Crisis_impact_on_RE.pdf> accessed 17 October 
2017 and Julien Chaisse, ‘Renewables re-energized? The Internationalization of Green Energy Investment Rules and 
Disputes’, (2016) 9 Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 269-281 
48 Charanne v Spain, RREEF v Kingdom of Spain See n 12 and Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar 
Luxembourg S.a.r.l. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Final Award (4 May 2017).   
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IV.  THE NORMATIVE SPHERE  
 
DEFINING THE NOTION OF CONFLICT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND IN THE INTRA-EU ECT CONTEXT  
 
From Jenks to Pauwelyn, scholarship has often devised rules aiming to resolve tensions 
and conflicts between international treaties.49Under public international law, a normative conflict 
has been generally understood as the impossibility of simultaneous performance of two norms 
which share the same subject-matter.50 
 
Although the scope of this article is not to analyse the existent practice and rules used to 
deal with the particular interactions of treaty conflicts, but rather to determine the type of 
relationship between the ECT and the EU legal order; it is noteworthy to mention certain 
interpretation approaches used in the intra-EU treaty practice.  Intra-EU arbitral tribunals have 
looked into principles of public international law in an attempt to approach the intra-EU ‘issue’.  
 
For example, according to VCLT Article 31(3)(c), EU Law could be included as “relevant 
rule of international law applicable in relations between the parties”.51 This approach could allow 
for a better understanding of the role of EU law in the context of intra-EU ECT investment 
disputes. Nonetheless, this approach is yet to be further discussed in practice and so far, there are 
some initial indications to incorporate a more systemic integration of EU Law in the intra-EU 
discussion. In Eureko the tribunal upheld that not only is the tribunal not precluded from 
considering EU Law but it can apply and take into account EU Law as part of the applicable law 
to the parties, either under German Law, the BIT or otherwise.52 In the particular context of ECT 
disputes, there is an explicit incorporation of Article 31(3)(c) into the text of the ECT, and it is 
precisely ECT Article 26(6) which recognises the principle of systemic integration. According to 
the Electrabel Tribunal, ECT Tribunals have the capacity to decide on the dispute in accordance 
with the ECT, applicable rules and principles of international law, which includes EU Law.53 
 
 
In this context, it should be also mentioned that some commentators believe that VCLT 
Article 59 deserves to be discussed. It is noteworthy to remember, that VCLT Article 59 is a 
provision which deals with the effect of subsequent treaties on the same subject-matter (emphasis 
                                                        
49 Wilfed Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International Law, 403-404. 
In this article Jenks describes conflicts between international treaties as an ‘imperfection’ of the international legal 
order, which is consequence of a lack of an unified legislative process in international law. On this issue see these 
general studies:  Mirja Ciesiolka, ‘A Contribution to Norm Conflict Resolution in a Fragmented International Legal 
Order’, Schweizer Studien zum Internationalen Recht – Estudes Suisses de Droit International (2015), 1-11; Mads 
Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press 2015) 1-36; Robert House, 
‘Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms: Concluding Thoughts’, in Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany Multi-Sourced 
Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 2011); M. Forteau, La Fragmentation du Droit Applicable aux 
Relations Internationals – Regards Croisés d’internationalistes Privatistes et Publicists, 27 Cahiers Internationaux 
(Pedone 2011), 143- 163; Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law 2003) 5-24; Ahmad Ghouri, Interaction and Conflict of Treaties in Investment 
Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2015), 150. Susan Franck, ‘Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and 
Dispute Systems Design’, (2007–2008) 92 Minnesota Law Review, 161-230; Anne van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law: The Case of International Investment Protection’, (2008) 17 Finnish Yearbook of International 
Law, 91-130; and Eirik Bjorge, ‘The Convergence of the Methods of Treaty Interpretation: Different Regimes, 
Different Methods of Interpretation?’  in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation, (Cambridge 
University Press 2015), pp. 498-535.  
50 Pauwelyn (n 49) 165. 
51 VCLT Article 31(3)(c).   
52 Phillip Strik, Shaping the Single European Market in the Field of Foreign Direct Investment (Hart 2014) 246.  
53 Electrabel v Hungary (n 7) para. 4.110  
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added). However, there are technical and substantive reasons to explain why VCLT Article 59 is 
not necessary a provision that should be analysed in detail in the intra-EU ECT context.  The 
technical reason is that, for this provision to operate, VCLT Article 59 requires the parties’ 
manifest intention to terminate the treaty. Currently, the EU sees in the ECT an important tool 
that promotes a stable energy framework for energy and transit, and there is no current official 
consideration that demonstrates that the EU wishes to terminate the ECT. Secondly, is that the 
effect of VCLT Article 59 is subject to the condition of satisfying the same subject matter 
requirement in both treaties, as discussed in detail below, the TFEU and the ECT do not cover the 
same subject matter.54  
 
Therefore, for proposes of this article, in order to construct the notion of conflict in the 
intra-EU ECT context, Pawelyn’s suggestion is used as guidance. More concretely, for a 
normative conflict to exist between the ECT and the TFEU, this would require that these two 
frameworks cover the same subject-matter and compliance with the ECT or the TFEU treaty will 
automatically impede the performance of the other. In contrast, if the ECT and the TFEU do not 
cover the same subject matter and they can be performed at the same time, it could be argued that 
there is no real normative conflict between the ECT and the TFEU. Instead, it would perhaps 
worthwhile to study if the relationship between the ECT and the TFEU is a relationship of tension 
that arises from the regulatory expansion of EU Energy Law into new areas which originally were 
exclusively covered by the ECT.  
 
ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE TFEU AND THE ECT 
 
A. Jurisdictional Analysis  
 
In the context intra-EU ECT arbitration, it has been previously argued that the jurisdiction of 
intra-EU ECT tribunals clashes with the jurisdiction of EU courts. This apparent clash gives the 
perception that public resources and public regulations are applied into a system that excludes the 
interference of the EU judicial system when intra-EU parties are on a dispute.55  
 
First, it is important to understand how jurisdiction is differently established under the ECT 
and in the EU legal order. Under the ECT, Article 26 is designed to cover disputes arising from 
an alleged breach of ECT’s substantive protections (Part III) of the Treaty, between an investor 
from a Contracting Party against a host State from another Contracting Party, concerning an 
investment of the former in the area of the latter. Under the TFEU, an investor has no legal 
standing to directly sue a MS in the CJEU. There is, however, under TFEU Article 344, the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to decide on disputes amongst its MS in relation to the 
application an interpretation of EU Law.56  
                                                        
54 This Chapter article does not attempt to assess the substantive conclusions produced by arbitral tribunals on treaty 
conflict but aims to assess the type of relationship between the ECT and the TFEU. The scope of this article is 
exclusively limited to question if there is a conflict between the ECT and the TFEU. Tasks to alleviate tension or to 
resolve conflicts between international treaties are not always delegated to the discretion of international tribunals. 
As a matter of fact, most of the modern treaties have created internal rules in case of tension or conflict with another 
international treaty, which is the case of the ECT and the TFEU, in the ECT is Article 16 and in the TFEU is Article 
351. 
55 Jan Kleinheisterkamp (n 17) 101.   
56 In the MOX Plant the CJEU’s interpretation on TFEU Article 344 has made clear that it only applies to disputes 
between MS. Daniel Bondansky and Cesare Romano, ‘European Communities v Ireland. Case C-459/03. Judgment’ 
(2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 1, 171-178 and Angelos Dimopoulos, ‘The validity and 
applicability of international investment agreements between EU Member States under EU and international law’ 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1, 86. 
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It is also relevant to note, that the exclusion of the EU judicial forum from ECT arbitration 
is supported by the absence of an ECT provision requesting disputing parties to exhaust local 
remedies.57 This means that ECT jurisdiction carries the possibility of arbitration tribunals 
applying provisions of EU Law and thus intruding into the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU.58  
 
In response to the claim that ECT arbitration conflicts with the EU judicial system, there 
are three main arguments. First, there is no treaty provision in the entire EU legal order that 
explicitly prohibits arbitration between their investors from one MS against another MS. 
Secondly, the available TFEU provisions addresses disputes between a MS-MS relationship but 
not the investor-MS relationship.59 Thirdly, the applicability of EU Law plays a limited role at 
the intra-EU ECT jurisdictional stage, which means that in order to establish jurisdiction on an 
intra-EU ECT dispute it would be sufficient for the arbitral tribunal to look into the requirements 
of the legal instruments bestowing consent, which is rather limited on issues of the applicable 
law. In other words, the jurisdictional scope of intra-EU ECT jurisdiction does not need to cover 
an assessment on the potential limitations EU Law could represent. 
 
 Also, there are some additional, but relevant, arguments to the perception that EU Law 
runs the potential risk of being interpreted without the input of the CJEU. This is predominantly 
because under TFEU Article 19 only national courts in the EU have the competence to request 
preliminary rulings to the CJEU. Accordingly, intra-EU arbitration tribunals –not being national 
courts in the EU– are not competent to refer to the CJEU questions on the interpretation of the 
acquis. This limitation has raised the critique that investment arbitration prevents relevant 
questions of EU Law from being submitted to the CJEU.60 
 
For example, in the intra-EU BIT case Eastern Sugar BV v. Czech Republic, the 
Respondent requested to the arbitration tribunal to refer questions about the interpretation of EU 
Law to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU.61 The Czech Republic submitted that it was necessary 
to know the CJEU’s opinion on the validity of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT. In response, 
the Eastern Sugar tribunal found that referral to the CJEU was not a route for the arbitration 
tribunal even if it has a seat in an MS.  In more detail, an argument which claims that intra-EU 
ECT tribunals cannot benefit from the input of the CJEU presupposes that investment tribunals 
inevitably would have to interpret EU Law. However, as explained below, EU Law might not 
necessarily play a relevant role in the considerations taken by an intra-EU ECT tribunal when 
establishing its own jurisdiction.  
 
 
                                                        
57 Under ECT Article 26(2)(a) there is a fork in the road provision. Nonetheless, there is no requirement for the 
exhaustion of local remedies according to the ECT dispute settlement clause, see in Malduva Sattorova, ‘Return to 
the Local Remedies Rule in European BITs? Power (Inequalities), Dispute Settlement and Change in Investment 
Treaty Law’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 2, 223-248. Also, under the ECT Annex ID, the 
European Commission (European Communities) has not given its unconditional consent to the submission of 
international arbitration. This means that any case brought by a foreign investor against the EU falls under ECT 
Article 26(2)(a) and there is no consent to submit the dispute to international arbitration. See Statement submitted by 
the European Communities to the Secretariat of the Energy Charter pursuant to Article 26(3)(b)(ii) of the Energy 
Charter Treaty, Official Journal of the European Communities, 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom: Council and 
Commission Decision of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects. 
58 Nikos Lavranos, ‘Member States BITs: Lost in transition? 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935625> accessed 20 May 2017 and Roberto Baratta, 
‘National Courts as “Guardians” and “Ordinary Courts” of EU Law: Opinion 1/09 of the ECJ’, (2011) 38 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 4, 297-320. 
59 TFEU Article 344.  
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First, in order to establish jurisdiction, international investment tribunals look into the 
legal instrument of the parties’ consent. In the case of intra-EU ECT disputes this instrument is 
the ECT, where EU Law bares limited relevance.62 More precisely, the ECT being the instrument 
of consent of between the disputing parties gives the basis to make any jurisdictional assessment 
in accordance with the applicable law stipulated in the ECT. In intra-EU ECT disputes, the ECT 
as the treaty conferring jurisdiction is also directing the arbitration tribunal to apply a specific 
body of law. This is according to ECT Article 26, which requires that the arbitration tribunal 
should rule “…in accordance with this Treaty (emphasis added) and the applicable rules and 
principles of international law…”.  
 
The practical consequence of ECT Article 26 is that an arbitration tribunal should apply 
the interpretation of the treaty (i.e. ECT) as well as the principles of international law.63 Therefore, 
intra-EU ECT tribunals are not directly bound to interpret EU Law when rendering a jurisdictional 
decision, simply because jurisdiction is established on the basis of the treaty giving consent. 
Moreover, even if the role of EU Law would have any relevance at the jurisdictional stage of the 
arbitration process there are certain control mechanisms that could operate. For example, an ECT 
(non-ICSID) award could be subject to challenge at a national court under the grounds that the 
award presents violations against the EU legal order.64 While in ICSID proceedings, parties could 
seek the annulment of an intra-EU ECT award if there is a breach of EU Law, under the basis that 
the tribunal exceeded its powers.65 Secondly, and most importantly -ECT arbitration tribunals do 
not circumvent the application of EU Law- ‘circumvent’ implies that there is an obligation of 
arbitration tribunals to apply EU Law, which from a reading of ECT Article 26 there is no such 
obligation.66 
 
Second, although there is a compelling argument about the lack of direct access to CJEU 
preliminary rulings, intra-EU ECT tribunals have some procedural options worthwhile of 
exploring. In this respect, it has also been argued that the lack of access to preliminary rulings 
                                                        
60 In the Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Ireland (EC v Ireland) C-459/03, in this case the 
dispute started during the construction of the plant that raised Ireland’s concerns about the radioactive contamination 
this plant could have caused. In particular, the Claimant (Ireland) alleged that the UK violated basic UNCLOS 
obligations including the one of carry out an environmental impact assessment. EC v Ireland is a parallel procedure 
from the arbitration case, where the European Commission brought a claim against Ireland to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). The Commission alleged breach of Article 292 of the EC Treaty and Article 193 of the 
EURATOM Treaty because at the moment the dispute was submitted to arbitration; Ireland failed to comply with 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU on the application of EC Law. See for example Hindelang (n 21), 201.  
61 On the 10 May 2016 the Supreme Court of Germany requested to the Court of Justice to the European Union to 
clarify the status of intra-EU BITS in the case of Eureko (Achmea) v. the Slovak Republic 
<http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2016&Seit
e=0&nr=74606&pos=1&anz=82> accessed 3 October 2017. 
62 Christian Tietje, ‘The Applicability if the Energy Charter Treaty in ICSID Arbitration of EU Nationals vs. EU 
Member States, Essays on Transnational Economic Law’ <http://telc.jura.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft78.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017. 
63 Some authors have reached the same conclusion: Richard Happ, ‘The Legal Status of the Investor vis-vis the 
European Communities: Some Salient Thoughts’, (2007) 74 International Arbitration Law Review, 74-81; Ole 
Spiermann, Applicable Law, in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008), 89-118 and Laurence Shore, The 
jurisdiction problem in the Energy Charter Treaty claims, (2007) International Arbitration Law Review < 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Shore-
TheJurisdictionProblemInEnergyCharterTreatyClaims.pdf> accessed 3 October 2017.  
64 Micula & Ors v Romania & Anor [2017] EWHC 31 (Comm) 
65 ICSID Convention Article 52(1)(b) and Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and Others v Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment (26 February 2016).  
66 In the intra-EU ECT practice, arbitral tribunals have interpreted EU Law in three different ways: as national law 
(Eureko v Slovak Republic), as international law (Electrabel v Republic of Hungary) and as a matter of fact (AES 
Summit v Republic of Hungary). 
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carve out relevant issues that can affect EU Law matters from the supervision and influence 
of the EU judicial control which has left out the participation of the EU internal judicial 
mechanism.67 However, access to preliminary rulings is not limited to a simple dichotomy. 
This is because reference to preliminary rulings to the CJEU is still discretionary, reference 
is not mandatory for MS national courts every time there is an issue about the interpretation 
of EU Law. 68  
 
Under national law of the MS, there are some other options to be explored which 
might allow intra-EU tribunals to refer questions of EU Law to the CJEU. 69 There is, for 
example, Section 45 of the English Arbitration Act, where at the request of one of the 
disputing parties, an English court may determine any question of EU Law arising during the 
proceedings. This route could be potentially used to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU 
via English Courts, when the seat of arbitration takes place in England.70  
 
                                                        
67 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, See  (n 17) 85-109, Dimopoulos (n 44), 63,87 and 91 and Phillip Strik, ‘From Washington 
with Love- Investor-State Arbitration and the Jurisdictional Monopoly of the Court of Justice of the European Union’, 
12 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 426. The contrary position would be the one taken in Eureko 
B.V. (Achmea) v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL - PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction (26 October 
2010) para 274, Markus Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, (2009) 26 Journal of International 
Arbitration 2, 181-191 and Hindelang (n 21) 198.  
68 “… Legal theory of acte de claire proves that there is no automatic reference to refer any question of EU Law …”  
in Electrabel v Hungary, See n 7, para. 4.148 and Eureko (Achmea) B.V. v The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No.2008-
13, Award on Jurisdiction (26 October 2010), para 282.  
69 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV (1999) ECR I-3055. Case 102/81 Nordsee 
Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG and Reederei 
Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG. (1982) ECR 1095, paras 10-13, Konstanze Von Papp, 
‘Clash of 'Autonomous Legal Orders': Can EU Member State Courts Bridge the Jurisdictional Divide between 
Investment Tribunals and the ECJ? - A Plea for Direct Referral from Investment Tribunals to the ECJ’, (2013) 50 
Common Market Law Review 4, 1039-1081, where the author suggested and explored some possibilities of an 
Arbitration Tribunal to refer preliminary rulings to the CJEU, John Gaffney, ‘Should Investment Treaty Tribunals 
Be Permitted to Request Preliminary Rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union?’, (2013) 10 
Transnational Dispute Management 2, 1-14  and Miloš Olík and David Fyrbach, ‘The Competence of Investment 
Arbitration to Seek Preliminary Rulings from European Courts’, (2011) Czech Yearbook of International Law, 191. 
See for example the CJEU Opinion 2/13, 18th December 2014. CJEU’s Opinion 2/13 is about the draft agreement on 
the EU’s accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) which highlighted its concern about the fact that accession to the ECHR: “…could affect the autonomy and 
effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure …”, 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-12/cp140180en.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017. This 
same problem was put forward by the CJEU when it was discussed the establishment of a specialised Patent Court, 
Opinion 1/09, 8th March 2009, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/arrets/09a001_en.pdf> accessed on 22 May 
2017. The Court of Justice opinion on the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms identified what according to the are  
problems with regard to ECHR compatibility with EU law, available at 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-12/cp140180en.pdf> accessed 4 February 2016 and 
Koen Lenaerts, ‘Effective judicial protection in the EU’ <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-
2013/files/interventions/koenlenarts.pdf, accessed 4 February 2017.  THIS ARGUMENT WAS PREVIOUSLY PUT 
FORWARD BY THE CJEU IN ITS OPINION 1/09 WHERE IT DESCRIBED THAT A PATENT COURT IS A FOREIGN COURT, 
WHICH WILL BE RESOLVING CONFLICTS THAT ARE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF EU NATIONAL COURTS 
INDISPENSABLE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF EU LAW EXCLUSIVELY BY THE TASK CONFERRED TO MEMBER 
STATES COURTS, R. Baratta, ‘National Courts as “Guardians” and “Ordinary Courts of EU Law: Opinion 1/09 of the 
ECJ’, (2011) 38 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 297 - 320. So far, the only case where an arbitration tribunal 
have referred a question of EU Law has been an arbitration tribunal constituted in accordance with the Danish Labour 
Law, this is the Dafos case, the CJEU consider an Arbitration Board qualified as “court or tribunal of a Member 
State” and it was able to request preliminary rulings in Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund 
Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss (1989) ECR 3209. 
70 Case C-174/84- Buik Oil v Sun International, ECLI:EU:C:1986:60, paras 6-7. 
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The second option is according to new CJEU case law.71 According to Merck Canada 
and Ascendi cases it is now considered that an arbitration process emanating from a standing 
offer to arbitrate, where the only choice is limited to selecting the type of arbitration 
proceedings (ad hoc or institutional); this arbitration tribunal could refer questions of 
preliminary rulings to the CJEU.72 In practice, this possibility is yet to be tested. 
 
 In investment arbitration practice, a very clear example illustrating the lack of a 
jurisdictional normative conflict is the ‘procedural simultaneity’ of the Electrabel and Dunamenti 
cases. Dunamenti was subject to the European Commission’s investigation and final decision of 
the PPA as an ‘unlawful State-aid’. This allowed Dunamenti, as a Hungarian company, to start 
proceedings at the European General Courts in Luxembourg. Dunamenti requested an annulment 
proceeding against the EC’s decision and the operative provisions. In this legal process the 
European Commission (not Hungary) participated as the Respondent as it was the authority who 
initiated the State-aid investigation. 73 
 
Conversely, Electrabel, who owned 75% of Dunamenti, is not part of these EU 
proceedings because it has no locus standi to challenge the validity of the European Commission’s 
decisions.74 The only legal forum Electrabel had as a foreign electricity investor in Hungary was 
the ECT. Therefore, Dunamenti and Electrabel were legally entitled to start different proceedings 
under different normative bodies; one European, the other international. The argument presuming 
that the ECT and TFEU cannot be performed at the same time has less value when analysing the 
different jurisdictional rights of Dunamenti and Electrabel that arise out from the same investment 
energy activity as there were entitle to different legal frameworks of rights and obligations  
 
To sum up, the jurisdictional analysis on the jurisdictional compatibility test applied 
between investment treaty law and TFEU primarily shows that there is no jurisdictional conflict 
between the TFEU and the ECT.  The TFEU and the ECT excludes each other’s jurisdiction and 
therefore the jurisdictional effects of the ECT and TFEU are of self-exclusion. This is because 
they are subject to different types of applicable laws and principles, which internally each legal 
framework self-determines and establish its own jurisdictional scope. For example, in the context 
of the ECT, it is the treaty itself that creates its own jurisdiction (ECT Article 26). 
 
                                                        
71 Case C‑377/13 Ascendi Beiras Litoral e Alta, Auto Estradas das Beiras Litoral e Alta, Acórdao do Tribunal de 
Justicia (Segunda Secção), paras 21-29 and Case C‑555/13 Merck Canada Inc. v Accord Healthcare Ltd and Others, 
paras 15-25. 
72 Case C‑567/14 Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmbH, formerly Hoechst AG, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH, 17 
March 2016, Opinion of AG Wathelet, fn. 34 and Paschalis Paschalidis, ‘Arbitral Tribunals and Preliminary 
References to the EU Court of Justice, Arbitration International’, (2016) Arbitration International, 1-23 < 
http://arbitration.oxfordjournals.org/content/arbint/early/2016/07/31/arbint.aiw026.full.pdf>, accessed 19 October 
2017.  
73 Case T-179/09 Dunamenti Erömü Zrt. v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:236.30 – 31.  
74 Electrabel v Hungary (n 7)  para 5.37.  
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In contrast, it is EU treaty law that dictates the scope of the CJEU and its MS, where for 
example TFEU Article 344 refers to disputes between MS, but it leaves without protection 
disputes that could possible arise between an MS investor against another MS. Most importantly, 
a right conferred to individual parties (i.e. investors) under a specific legal framework cannot be 
withdrawn because of obligations between states in other legal orders, which means that EU Law 
obligations between MS and the EU do not exempt MS from fulling their treaty obligations under 
the ECT. Therefore, for the reasons here explained the very nature of the EU judicial system is 
self-exclusive, leaving no possibility for foreign tribunals to refer preliminary rulings to the 
CJEU, yet.  
 
 
This jurisdictional analysis has also revealed semantic abuse by some literature that 
accuses the ECT jurisdiction of infringing, circumventing and violating EU Law. The 
circumventing argument would imply that there is a (in) direct obligation of intra-EU ECT 
investment tribunals to observe EU Law while deciding their jurisdictional competence. 
Notwithstanding the fact that jurisdiction of ECT tribunals is only bound by the instrument 
bestowing consent, which as mentioned, is the ECT and where there is nothing in the ECT -and 
in the EU legal order- which prohibits the MS and its individuals from participating in arbitration 
proceedings. 
 
B. Substantive Analysis between the TFEU and the ECT 
 
The applicability of the ECT to resolve intra-EU energy disputes has predominantly been 
questioned at the jurisdictional stage and limited attention has been paid to a potential substantive 
normative conflict between the ECT and the TFEU. The general premise should be that the EU 
and its MS being ECT signatories presumes that EU Law is not in conflict with the ECT. 
Nonetheless, it is also fair to say that during the ECT negotiations; the potential effects of the fast 
expansion of EU policies into new energy areas might have brought some normative chaos about 
the applicability of the ECT to resolve intra-EU ECT disputes.  
 
Looking into the substantive content of each framework, EU Law is very specific 
regarding the promotion of fair market competition and state aid prohibitions. In contrast, the 
ECT creates an adequate environment for foreign investors to be treated in the same manner as a 
national investor, giving the effect of elevating nationals of a MS and other MS investors to the 
same level of economic competitiveness. For example, while the national treatment standard 
envisaged in the ECT is broader and without restrictions, EU freedoms are subject to different 
control mechanisms not only by each MS, but also by the CJEU, whereas national treatment under 
the ECT is only subject to interpretation by arbitration tribunals without any restrictive effect on 
subsequent disputes. Moreover, a general appreciation of the EU trade provisions against ECT 
investment treaty protections reveals that while the EU offers qualified rights, the ECT offer 
broader protections to foreign investors.  
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Under intra-EU ECT arbitration, there are two frequently invoked substantive protections 
used as defence of the regulatory actions taken by the respondents. The analysis below pays 
particular attention to the standard of protection of Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and 
compensation in case of expropriation. FET is perhaps the only international investment 
protection where its non-incompatibility with EU Law has been generally agreed, simply because 
there is no equivalent in the EU Treaties.75 In contrast, the ECT explicitly creates conditions to 
include commitments to treat investors and their investments of other contracting parties in a fair 
and equitable manner. A fair and equitable treatment operates specific circumstances ranging 
from protection of investors’ legitimate expectations, good faith, transparency, non-arbitrary 
treatment, stable political framework and due process.76  
 
Nonetheless, under EU Law, there are some manifestations of what could be an EU fair 
and equitable treatment. First, under the investment treaty practice is common knowledge that the 
application and interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment is dependent on the 
circumstances and context where fairness and equity was meant to be considered. It is also well 
accepted that among the diverse set of the FET manifestations are: equal treatment, transparency, 
due process, legitimate expectations, etc. Under the EU legal order, there is no notion which has 
replicated the flexible and dynamic outreach of FET. However, it is noteworthy to mention that 
under EU Law there are already some notions similar to the FET ‘guarantees’ in investment treaty 
practice. In particular in the context of, equal treatment (non-discrimination) and legitimate 
expectations.  
 
In the case of equal treatment, under EU Law, there is a broad enunciation of the principle 
of non-discrimination. Broadly speaking the principle of non-discrimination guarantees to confer 
an equal treatment to all EU nationals, including EU companies.77 In this respect the substantive 
protection granted in FET under the ECT, as far an equal and non-discriminatory treatment 
concerns is already available under the EU legal order.  
 
 
Similarly, as one of the fundamental principles of EU Law, there is the principle of 
protecting legitimate expectations. At the CJEU, according to the case Van den Bergh en Jurges 
any trader who has justified hopes may relay on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectation unless he could have foreseen the adoption of a measure likely to affect his interests.78 
However, under EU Law, legitimate expectations are strictly conditioned to three requirements: 
(i) precise and consistent assurances by the EU administration, (ii) those assurances must give 
rise to legitimate expectations and (iii) assurances must be consistent with the applicable rules.79 
This indicates that it is possible that in the foreseeable future CJEU case law could construct a 
principle equivalent to FET under the ECT. However, this is currently a notion under 
development, and so far under EU Law there is no existent principle that holistically encapsulates 
all the manifestations given to the FET standard.  
 
                                                        
75Angelos Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2011), 315. 
76 Ibid, 65. 
77 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain v Finanzamt Aachen-Innestadt [1999] ECR I-6161, para 59. See also: “…The Court 
accordingly ruled that the national treatment principle requires the Member State that is party to such a treaty to 
grant to permanent establishments of companies resident in another Member State the advantages provided for by 
the agreement on the same conditions as those which apply to companies resident in the Member State that is party 
to the treaty.” in Case C-55/00 Gottardo v INPS [2002] ECR I-413, para 32. 
78 Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Foods Products (Lopik) v EEC [1987] ECR 1155, para 44.  
79  T-427/04 and T-17/05 France and France Telecom v Commission [2009] ECR II-4315. 
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Unlike FET, previous literature advocating for EU and investment treaties as two systems 
of normative conflict have vaguely discussed the standard of investment protection of 
compensation in case of expropriation. In the ECT context, the reason for this might be the fact 
that while in the ECT there is a thorough coverage of expropriation, there are no explicit 
provisions within TFEU directly regulating the principle of fair compensation in case of 
expropriation. In other words, EU Law does not impose on their MS laws related to national 
systems of property ownership.80 Therefore, it has been argued that this protection, in principle 
does not exist at EU level.81 Nonetheless, in the case of property rights and compensation, there 
are ‘similar’ European principles that can be compared with the ECT right of fair compensation.82 
For example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union strengthens property 
rights.83 This Charter determines the conditions under which deprivation and limitation measures 
against property rights are tolerated.84In addition, the CJEU has recognised that the absence of 
specific EU rules on expropriation is due to the fact that, as a national measure, they fall into the 
competence of each MS.85 However, at the same time MS must respect the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which recognises and establishes the right to property in Article 17. 
 
So far, according to the CJEU, the EU legal order protects property rights aiming to 
establishing conditions under which these rights could be altered or modified.86 For the CJEU, 
the right to property is not an unfettered right, and it is possible to deny or restrict as long as those 
restrictions or prohibitions are consistent with general objectives pursued by the EU. The caveat 
is that these protections and conditions would only operate, if the modification on the property 
right results from an act derived from the implementation of EU Law. Therefore, under CJEU 
case law, there is no remedy for expropriation from an act derived from a national measure of a 
MS.  
However, in Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson it was concluded that the CJEU’s 
scope of application does not govern or precludes national courts to apply provisions that are 
contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, unless that infringement was clear from the text 
of the Charter, the case law or in cooperation with the CJEU.87In terms of substance, according 
to the CJEU, there are two principal ways to analyse and conceptualise the notion of the right to 
property. First, under EU Law the right of property is an economic right.88 However, there is no 
explicit provision under the TFEU, which gives direct recognition to this type of economic 
individual’s rights. Second, there is an alternative option, which is the effect of the Hauer 
principle.89 This principle states that through TEU Article 6(3) there is recognition of the rights 
embodied in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
 
Having identified the right to property within the acquis, there are two difficulties that 
remain unresolved. First, under EU Law, there is no clarity on the consequences of the breach of 
the right to property. Secondly, MS’ authorities are bound to comply with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights when implementing EU Law, and therefore access to the protections 
                                                        
80 Article 345 TFEU. 
81 “…all BITs offer foreign investors fair and equitable treatment (FET) and protection against 
expropriation; rights which do not exists as such in EU Law …” Angelos Dimopoulos (n 75) 315. 
82Jan Kleinheisterkamp (n 17) 98.  
83 For many years the Charter was not seen as a document considered part of the legal instruments of the European 
Union, but rather it was considered an authoritative statement.  After the Lisbon Treaty, the document has become 
legally binding on the European Union in Damian Chamlers, Gareth Davis and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law 
(Cambridge University Press (2010), 238. See also Christopeher McCrudden, ‘The Future of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/10 
<http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/013001.html> accessed 17 February 2016. 
84 Article 17 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Dimopoulos (n 63) 113. 
85 C-309/96 Annibaldi v Sindaco del Commini di Guidoma [1997] ECR I-7493. 
86 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus [1996] ECR I-3953 and Case C-4/73 Nold [1974] ECR I-491.  
87 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2012:340. 
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presumes that one shall exhaust local remedies. Corollary, this exhaustion of local remedies 
means that an energy investor making the claim will be subject to national standards of 
compensation.  
 
Most importantly, under the CJEU case law, interference of property rights should not be 
disproportionate or intolerable.90In this sense, there is nothing in the law of the acquis referring 
to the law of expropriation, its definition, requirements and consequences. Moreover, the analysis 
of the law of expropriation is limited and only very general concepts can be drawn from case law. 
For example, in The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment the Advocate General Léger 
gave an opinion in which he mentions that any act of denying or limiting an owner of her right to 
property, which results in being prevented from disposing of her rights amounts to 
expropriation.91 For AG Léger, proportionally was a key principle, which is understood as a 
measure which should be in accordance with public policy interests, such as public health which 
in this case was the fact that polluted water can affect agricultural practices and therefore the 
imposition of this Directive on the farmers’ land in order to reduce water pollution caused by 
nitrates is not unjustified as such to affect the principle of proportionality. This means, in the EU 
specific context, that proportionality between the measure and the policy objectives is the core 
standard when assessing the interference of an individual’s property right. This has created 
ambiguity and uncertainty for the property right owner, as the level of compensation might vary 
in accordance with this ‘proportionality test’ but also there is no clear approach for the calculation 
of compensation. Moreover, under the EU legal order, interference of property rights is one, 
which does not necessarily include a general right of full compensation.92 This approach is 
supported by the priority given to the proportionality test and the measure implemented aiming 
to preserve a legitimate public interest, which may call for a lesser reimbursement of the full 
market value.93  
 
Previous commentators have also observed that, while the analysis by the CJEU gives a 
secondary role to compensation; the primary task is to assess the proportionality of the measure 
taken.94 Conversely, international public law has addressed the assessment of compensation as a 
primary issue. In particular, the ECT requires compensation according to the fair market value at 
the time of expropriation, which is basically the Hull formula.95 In addition, in the context of ECT 
                                                        
88Anna De Lucca, ‘Indirect Expropriation and Regulatory Takings: what Role for the ‘Legitimate Expectations” of 
Foreign Investors?’ in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Pia Acconci, Mara Valenti and Anna De Lucca (eds.), General Interests of 
Host States in International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 58-75.  
89 Case C-44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, para 15. Moreover, the CJEU in this case confirms 
direct links between the standard of protection under Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and 
standards of protection under ECHR and case law developed by the ECtHR. This link is also expressly acknowledged 
in Articles 52 and 53 of the Fundamental Charter (express references to ECHR) and Case C-501/11 Schindler Holding 
and others v Commission [2013] OJ. 
90 Case C-265/87 Schräder v Hauptzalant Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, para 15. 
91 Case C-293/97 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Opinion of AG Léger, paras 61-61 and Case 
C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, para 78.    
92 Case C-347/03 ERSA [2005] ECR I-3785. 
93 Strik (n 52).  
94 Strik (n 52). Eureko v Slovak Republic (n 54) 261 “… the protection in Article 5 of the BIT against expropriation 
is by no means covered by the EU freedom of establishment. While it certainly overlaps with the right to property 
secured by Article 17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (and the First Protocol to the ECHR, as applied 
under EU law), the BIT provision on expropriation is not obviously co-extensive with it. Both the considerable body 
of jurisprudence on indirect takings that has emerged in the context of BITs, and also the fact that the BIT protects 
“assets” and “investments” rather than the arguably narrower concepts of “possessions” and “property” protected 
by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, give rise to the possibility of wider protection under the BIT than is 
enjoyed under EU law…”. 
95 Patrick Norton, ‘Back to the Future: expropriation in the Energy Charter Treaty’ in Thomas Wälde, European 
Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade? (Kluwer 1996), 365-385.   
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investment treaty protection, fair compensation is one of the core principles when expropriating 
investor’s property rights. Therefore, there is a fundamental difference between EU Law and the 
ECT, as the ECT provides for clarity when defining expropriation and the methods by which they 
are entitled to fair payment.  
 
The ECT provides for compensation of foreign investors in a prompt, adequate and 
effective manner if their investments are nationalised, expropriated or subject to a measure having 
an equivalent effect.96 In addition, the ECT draws distinctions between acts by the government or 
authorities and loss caused by non-governmental agents. Unlike EU Law, the ECT guarantees 
compensation from acts made by governmental authorities that amount to destruction of an 
investment (ECT Article 12(2)). For example, in Plama v Bulgaria the tribunal recognised that a 
State’s conduct provoking negative effects on the monetary value of the investment (even with 
no physical control or loss of title over the asset at stake), could result in expropriation as 
consequence of the adverse effects on the economic value of the investment.97  
 
In the ECT, the coverage of expropriation is as exhaustive as possible; nationalisation, 
expropriation and any other measures having equivalent effects are forbidden, unless the measure 
was for public interest and accompanied by compensation.98 In contrast to the EU analysis of 
public interest, the ECT observes public propose not as a core element to modify property rights, 
but public propose as a requirement of the expropriation’s legality.99 Thus, investment protections 
under the ECT give investors more certainty and greater likelihood of receiving a fair monetary 
compensation. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that there is not incompatibility between the 
EU right to property and the ECT substantive protection of compensation in case of expropriation. 
This is because the rationale used in each system addresses different elements of property rights, 
and in the case of the ECT the protection is broader, ensuring that the investor will be entitled to 
full monetary compensation in accordance with the fair market value. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
In Europe, the need of contouring the law and policy of the energy sector has played a 
unique and crucial role at intersecting two major legal orders; the Energy Charter Treaty is the 
point of convergence between international investment treaty arbitration and the legal order of 
the EU. This point of convergence has caused tension about the status of investment arbitration 
in the EU. Previously legal treatises, despite providing for limited evidence, have claimed that the 
negotiation and creation of the ECT, as a treaty binding for intra-EU cross-border energy 
investments was an ‘historical mistake’.100 This historical mistake, the argument was, should be 
alleviated by the presumption of an implicit disconnection clause between all the intra-EU parties 
(i.e. MS, the EU, and investors from a MS).  
                                                        
96Andrews-Speed and Thomas Wälde, ‘Will the Energy Charter Treaty help international investors?’ 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=28399> accessed on 10 January 2017 and  Christoph 
Schreuer, Rapport: The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties in Clarisse 
Ribeiro, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty  (Juris 2006),  110.    
97 Other arbitration tribunals have not considered the existence of expropriation if the investor has not been deprived 
physically from its property, see for example Petrobart Ltd (Gilbraltar) v Kyrgyzstan, SCC Case No126/2003, Award 
(13 February 2003), 77 and CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8, 
Award (12 May 2005), para 254.  
98 ECT Article 13 (1).  
99 Sergei Lebedev, ‘Introduction: The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other investment protection, in 
Clarisse Ribeiro, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, (Juris  2006), 144 and Energy Charter 
Secretariat, ‘Expropriation Regime under the Energy Charter Treaty’ 
<http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Thematic/Expropriation_2012_en.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2017.  
100 Kleinheisterkamp (n 17). 
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The analysis above reveals that the policy expansion of the EU has created a ‘regulatory 
spill’ in the energy sector which previously was previously regulated by other legal frameworks. 
In recent years, the EU has now moved into a more solid and comprehensive legal order with 
rules and policy goals on a common commercial energy market and is currently designed to secure 
energy supply by means of fair market competition while integrating measures to address 
different aspects of energy transactions within the EU. In contrast, the ECT ensures a level playing 
field based on non-traditional EU principles that generate and promote legal uniformity and 
consensus on energy security policies and builds a legal framework for global energy security 
based on the principles of transparency, open and -most importantly- non-discriminatory markets.  
 
However, despite the differences between the policy and legal objectives of the ECT and 
EU (Energy) Law, there has been a general perception of a possible normative conflict between 
the ECT and the TFEU. The jurisdictional and substantive analysis above, presented a cross- 
analysis of the most relevant and frequently invoked normative issues and principles that 
characterise the intra-EU relationship between the TFEU and ECT. The analysis provided for a 
more structured evidence that clarifies the status of the relationship between the ECT and the 
TFEU.  
 
As a general conclusion, this study has revealed that the normative relationship that 
characterises the TFEU-ECT is not in conflict. The establishment of jurisdiction in intra-EU-ECT 
disputes does not infringe EU Law, as the ECT investor is bringing an ECT claim in an ECT 
tribunal. First there is an absence of any norm or principle which explicitly prohibits arbitration 
between an investor from one MS against another MS. Moreover, the available TFEU provisions 
in regard to ‘jurisdictional restrictions’ addresses only the relationship between MS and not the 
relationship between MS nationals and other MS. To contrary, the jurisdictional scopes of the 
ECT and the TFEU have a self- exclusion effect which has clearly delimitations of its ambit of 
application and users. Even if one would assume that EU Law is at stake due the establishment 
of jurisdiction of an intra-EU ECT dispute there are post award mechanisms that can ensure that 
an arbitration tribunal did not exceed its powers and respected EU Law.  
The substantive analysis revealed that ECT and the TFEU do not cover the same subject 
matter.  ECT substantive protections are broad and aim primarily to protect foreign investors 
under certain principles of international public law. In this respect, FET offers a clear example to 
illustrate the absence of a conflict between the ECT and the TFEU as the FET protection simply 
does not fully guarantee a fair and equitable treatment for MS energy investors making 
investments in another MS. In the case of expropriation, the CJEU has also taken a line of 
reasoning more concerned about the proportionality of the measure to protect a public interest 
rather than giving heavier weight to adequate and fair monetary compensation. In contrast, the 
ECT offers a clear definition and standards on the notion of expropriation as well as fair and 
adequate compensation for the protection of property rights under the ECT.   
 
To conclude, having identified the lack of a real jurisdictional and substantive normative 
conflict between the TFEU and the ECT, it could be argued that when an intra-EU ECT dispute 
arises, there is an opportunity to choose different avenues which offer different types of standards 
of protection. This opportunity means that there is no fundamental normative conflict between 
the TFEU and the ECT, but rather there is a relationship of regulatory tension arising from the 
policy expansion of the EU legal order.  
